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The individual is ineffable.
—Wilhelm Dilthey1
In the introduction to the Critique of Judgment, Immanuel Kant main-
tained that the subject cannot theoretically know itself as a thing in 
itself.2 Kant denied the possibility of knowing oneself directly through 
intuition or theoretically through knowledge, at the same time as moral 
reasoning compels agents to postulate an independent autonomous self. 
The Platonic idea of self- knowledge, and the unity of morality and ra-
tional knowledge or practical and theoretical reason, is to this extent 
impossible due to the epistemic constraints placed on theoretical knowl-
edge and the delimited scope of practical rationality in Kant’s fi rst two 
critiques. This suspicion encompasses traditional rational psychology, as 
the metaphysics of mind and soul, can no longer be a feasible option 
after the critique of theoretical and practical reason.
This is not Kant’s fi nal word concerning psychology. The ineffabil-
ity of the subject to itself, its non- transparency to itself, did not prohibit 
Kant from articulating elements of transcendental psychology in the Cri-
tique of Pure Reason. Furthermore, Kant engaged in  empirical- pragmatic 
inquiry into human psychology and anthropology. However, among late 
 nineteenth- and early  twentieth- century neo- Kantians, especially Wilhelm 
Dilthey’s critic Heinrich Rickert, the Kantian paradigm is construed, 
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contrary to Kant, as abandoning psychology exclusively to the natural 
sciences. The neo- Kantian approach diverged from Dilthey’s more his-
torically informed Kantian position that psychology is a human science 
as well as necessary to understanding cognition and the nature of scien-
tifi c inquiry.
As a Geisteswissenschaft, psychology incorporates causal and natural-
istic explanations of human behavior from a  third- person perspective in 
contrast to positing an ideal realm of reasoning about “valid” ahistori-
cal truths embedded in cultural values. Psychology already fundamen-
tally involves (1) social, historical, and cultural dimensions that inform 
and orient human thought and practice, and presupposes (2)  fi rst- and 
 second- person processes of understanding, interpretation, and com-
munication. Because of the mediating conditions of the self, I am not 
transparent to myself in intuition or introspection. I do not know myself 
directly but at best indirectly through understanding and interpreting 
my own practices, narratives, expressions, feelings, and the conditions 
of my life.
In contrast with Kant, Dilthey did not offer a transcendental psy-
chology independent of empirical psychology but argued for main-
taining both the empirical and interpretive dimensions of psychologi-
cal inquiry. Human consciousness, behavior, and agency are mediated 
through their biological conditions,  social- historical nexus or context, 
and through social and individual ways of understanding, expressing, 
and interpreting one’s own life. Based on Kant’s fi rst Critique and its neo- 
Kantian interpretation nothing might appear less Kantian. Yet—despite 
the many differences—Dilthey interpreted himself as an heir to Kant’s 
critical philosophy, while challenging its reifi ed dualistic division into 
empirical nature and ideal normative value upheld in neo- Kantianism.
There are two signifi cant historical sources for Dilthey’s approach. 
Not unlike Schleiermacher, it is misunderstanding, confusion, and in-
ability to know the other that is the point of departure for interpretation 
as understanding that has become aware of the impossibility of trans-
parent understanding and knowledge of oneself and others. Similarly, 
Dilthey separated hermeneutics into two complementary and overlap-
ping strategies. Whereas linguistic interpretation examines a common 
language and its individuation in language use, psychological interpre-
tation considers the singular individual in relation to its life- conditions 
and contexts. Like Kant in the Critique of Judgment, Dilthey is concerned 
with how to articulate the singular without destroying it and how to tran-
sition from the singular to the more general through what Kant calls re-
fl ective judgment and Dilthey designates interpretation. Psychology and 
language are linked in Dilthey, as are the “feeling of life” (Lebensgefühl) 
and sensus communis in Kant’s third Critique.3
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Through Kant’s conception of the feeling of life and Dilthey’s 
interest in biological and bodily life, Dilthey’s hermeneutical  cultural- 
historically oriented “life- philosophy” (or Lebensphilosophie, as it was 
categorized retrospectively by Max Scheler) is connected with the anti- 
reductionist and anti- mechanistic philosophy of nature inherited from 
thinkers as diverse as Leibniz, Goethe, and Schelling. Reifying the dif-
ference between natural explanation and human understanding, nature 
and spirit, facticity and validity, and the natural and historical worlds in 
order to prioritize the latter is more characteristic of neo- Kantianism and 
 twentieth- century hermeneutics than it was of Dilthey, who advocated a 
non- reductive and hermeneutical empiricism.4
Rudolf Makkreel has argued in Imagination and Interpretation in Kant 
and Dilthey: Philosopher of the Human Studies that the Critique of Judgment 
has  proto- hermeneutical aspects that have deep philosophical affi nities 
that help to illuminate Dilthey’s overall project.5 Makkreel examined 
this relation primarily in terms of aesthetics through the feeling of life, 
hermeneutics through refl ective judgment, and the philosophy of his-
tory through immanent purposiveness. I pursue a complementary path 
in this chapter to the implications of this immanent purposiveness for 
the nexus of psychology and language, nature and spirit, and knowledge 
and the ineffable in Kant’s third Critique and Dilthey’s works. For Schlei-
ermacher it is the religious ineffability of God and the human soul that 
inspires his theological hermeneutical project, whereas for Dilthey it is 
the ineffability of this individual life itself or an immanent worldly exis-
tence that encourages the reformulation of hermeneutics as historical, 
linguistic, and psychological interpretation in the context of the human 
sciences.6
Kant, Nature, and the “Feeling of Life”
A number of Kant’s earliest intellectual endeavors are devoted to ex-
plaining natural phenomena or articulating the basis of human inquiry 
into nature.7 Though Kant’s mature critical natural philosophy has been 
decisive for modern thought, which brackets nature as more than a 
causal order, the other side of his thinking about nature often remains 
underappreciated even by Kantian inspired thinkers, particularly the 
neo- Kantian movement from Hermann Cohen to Heinrich Rickert, if 
not Ernst Cassirer, and in contemporary thinkers such as Habermas and 
Honneth who continue to prioritize spirit in the form of intersubjec-
tive communication. In radically separating nature and spirit, facticity 
and validity, and causality and morality, inadequate refl ection is given 
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to other dimensions of Kant’s thought that are expressed to varying de-
grees in the pre- critical writings, the Critique of Judgment, his historical and 
political writings, and the Opus Postumum.8
Kant is not exclusively a thinker of the rationality and scientifi -
cally knowable character of nature as a phenomenal order; he also con-
ceived of nature in more ambitious and ambiguous terms. In his earliest 
thought, he examined the physical world by differentiating the living and 
dead forces of nature. In his mature critical philosophy, he approached 
nature as a Newtonian order of mechanical causality in the Critique of 
Pure Reason; as the setting of the application of moral responsibility and 
religious hope in the Critique of Practical Reason; and as purposive and sub-
lime through the feeling of life and refl ective judgment in the Critique of 
Judgment. The systematic and historical signifi cance of this intersection of 
nature, freedom, culture, and individual experience and its cultivation in 
Kant’s feeling of life, the feelings of pleasure and displeasure and their 
intensifi cation and diminishment, is more central than typically recog-
nized, and a reference point for Dilthey.
The context of the development of Kant’s thinking of Lebensgefühl 
encompasses Leibniz’s argument that there is an organic or vital dimen-
sion to nature and, against Descartes and the Cartesians, that the theory 
of “living force” (vis viva) was a necessary condition for physics. As part of 
his project of integrating the new  mathematical- mechanical explanation 
of nature with traditional religious and metaphysical insights into the 
nature of things, Leibniz explained nature and spirit as being continuous 
in consisting of myriad organic “monads” or “living points” that are dy-
namic, perspectival, and purposive unities. “All of nature is full of life,” as 
nature consists of living monads, or vital seeds, and their aggregations.9 
Leibniz’s monadology thereby explains the individuation of substances 
from things to souls, and demonstrates the compatibility of individual 
freedom and morality with the causal material order of nature.
Taking his point of departure from the  eighteenth- century debate 
over living forces, Kant’s fi rst work attempted to distinguish living and 
mechanical forces of nature (1747; AA 1:1–182 ). This work was deeply 
fl awed and Kant abandoned this project as he assimilated Newton’s phys-
ics and natural philosophy, becoming one of the fi rst to apply the New-
tonian project to a wide range of natural phenomena (e.g., the Kant- 
Laplace nebular hypothesis).10 By the time of the composition of the 
fi rst Critique, the concept of living forces no longer has a constitutive role 
in physics or natural philosophy. Nevertheless, traces and analogues of 
Kant’s early interest in living nature and his project of distinguishing 
living and dead forces remain at work, including—despite its apparent 
anthropocentric conclusion—his portrayal of experiences of the sub-
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lime and his return to a more dynamic conception of material nature in 
the Opus Postumum (e.g., the deduction of the ether). A richer notion of 
“life” continues to inform Kant’s thinking.
This is a controversial thesis given Kant’s Newtonian physical world 
and his understanding of nature in the context of his moral philosophy. 
The postulate of an intelligible moral world and radical application of 
the moral law to sensuous existence in the second Critique and other 
practical writings has been criticized as the exclusion and domination 
of nature and bodily life from Nietzsche to Adorno. Likewise, as Adorno 
contends, nature as sublime and potentially purposive in the third Cri-
tique remains an anthropocentric and bourgeois gesture of spirit’s do-
minion over abject nature that is inadequate to sensuous material exis-
tence and animal suffering.11 Nature as a refl ectively achieved whole in 
the “Critique of Teleological Judgment” and dynamic interdependent 
whole in his fi nal writings might be too little too late in contrast with ro-
mantic Naturphilosophie.
Although I cannot respond to all of these issues in detail in here, 
I will sketch a strategy for addressing them and pointing toward Dilthey. 
Kant has a more complex approach to nature than its intelligibility as a 
mechanical or phenomenal order, as evident in the Critique of Judgment 
interpreted in an alternative light. Kant’s critics have emphasized the in-
adequacy and exhaustion of natural beauty and the sublime before the 
avowal of human dignity as higher and other than nature. Still, nature 
(as beautiful and sublime to feeling and tentatively purposive and inter-
connected for refl ection) can be explicated through the feeling of life, 
its comportment or disposition in being intensifi ed or diminished in the 
beautiful and the sublime, and the  proto- hermeneutics of refl ective judg-
ment from the singular to the more general and from feeling to rational 
articulation. This is not about discovering the grail of the hidden unity 
of the third Critique and Kant’s critical philosophy as a whole; it concerns 
clarifying nature and the relation of human freedom and individuality 
to nature.
In opposition to anthropocentric humanism and personalism, with 
their problematic metaphysical assumptions about the human, natural-
istic, postmodern, or post- humanist interpretations of the uncanny sub-
lime suggest that the everyday conventions and personal life of the indi-
vidual are disrupted by overwhelming impersonal powers that reveal the 
“human” to be a false ideological construction and the world to be an 
aesthetic, material, or mystical play of nonhuman forces. There is, how-
ever, a third option between anthropocentric humanism and impersonal 
naturalism. This is intimated in Kant’s Critique of Judgment and its recep-
tion from Schiller and Dilthey to Marcuse and to some extent Lyotard, 
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who rejected the oversimplistic identifi cation of the sublime with a poli-
tics of the sublime that would be terror and its celebration.12
Whereas the beautiful “carries with it directly a feeling of life’s 
being furthered,” the sublime “is a pleasure that arises only indirectly; it 
is produced by the feeling of a momentary inhibition of the vital forces 
followed immediately by an outpouring of them that is all the stronger.”13 
Kant’s sublime risks destroying the person while disclosing the possibility 
of reaffi rming the dignity of the individual in relation to the natural 
world. By placing it at risk, the abyss and terror of the sublime heightens 
the feeling of life, which is historically connected with early modern dis-
courses of vis viva and the more materialist notion of the conatus, and is 
equally the possibility of renewed individuation in relation to the forces 
of nature. In relation to the forces and conditions of life, humans fi nd 
their own purpose in themselves and individuate themselves as moral be-
ings in a worldly context.
Individuation cannot be adequately understood as the subsump-
tion of a particular under a universal category or the exemplarity of a 
type, as is the case with determinate judgment, and thus cannot be in-
terpreted as the dominion of active spirit over passive nature. Individu-
ation is not the assimilative drive and mastery of the conatus. It is the 
unpredetermined responsive and refl ective generation, formation, and 
cultivation of individual and social aesthetic and moral sensibilities in 
relation to the particular phenomena. This includes nature and feeling. 
The third Critique is accordingly about the generation and articulation 
of concepts. It concerns the coming to word and concept of that which 
is heterogeneous, not given, or without a concept;14 that is, the sensu-
ous, the natural, and the felt in art and genius, language and the sensus 
 communis.
The sensus communis is a common shared sense, proceeding 
through feelings rather than a common conceptual understanding.15 As 
such, it allows for the relation and interpretation of the non- cognitive 
and non- conceptual, in particular feeling.16 It constitutes a realm of pre- 
understandings that include and go beyond the conservative functions of 
reproducing custom, habit, and tradition, since it is expansive and open 
to be transformed by the new. The pinnacle of individuation in Kant is 
the genius who discovers novel ideas and ways of sharing them.17 Genius 
provides innovative forms and models for encountering and interpreting 
phenomena and oneself. Correspondingly, the genuinely and transfor-
matively “new” has a signifi cant role in Dilthey’s approach to traditional 
society, culture, and art.18
In the Critique of Judgment, Kant explored how nature can be judged 
refl ectively as having purposes, humans can be said to be ultimate pur-
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poses, and art can embody and enact “purposefulness without purpose” 
or purposiveness without a teleological fi nal cause. This playful and an-
archic removal of barriers and predetermined purposes in experiencing 
the beautiful and the sublime is connected with the feeling of life and 
contrasted with the seriousness of ethical, political, and religious pur-
poses as fi nal ends. Such felt spontaneity and playfulness, as the promise 
of freedom from a predetermined purpose and as responsiveness in re-
lation to the forces and conditions of life, indicates a non- instrumental, 
non- coercive, and non- dominating activity understood as a creative re-
ceptiveness or responsive spontaneity in encountering the myriad things 
and the world as an ineffable whole that invites further investigation and 
inquiry.19 Kant’s third Critique is not then simply either the aesthetic use 
or moralistic domination of nature but is deeply ethical in locating the 
individuation and self- articulation of the person in a worldly, sensuous, 
and bodily as well as a social context. The self does not cognitively or 
theoretically know itself but fi nds itself in the third Critique in its com-
portment, cultivation (Bildung), and culture in relation to nature, the 
sublime, and the supersensible.20
“Life” from Leibniz to Dilthey
Kant’s work is a decisive connection between Leibniz—who uses organic 
models to introduce intelligible principles such as appetite, perception, 
and purposiveness into nature—and  nineteenth- century Naturphiloso-
phie, Lebensphilosophie, and  pseudo- scientifi c vitalism.21 Indeed, these ideas 
have been criticized for their reliance and reifi cation of teleology and or-
ganicism, yet the different thinkers associated with these categories and 
movements may be distinguished and examined in their own terms. For 
example, Dilthey, though sometimes vaguely associated with these move-
ments, was a critic of employing vitalist, teleological, and organic models 
in the natural and human sciences.
Dilthey was an advocate of natural scientifi c inquiry, which he 
also wrote about, since the natural sciences legitimately pursued 
 mathematical- deductive and  causal- explanatory theories of natural phe-
nomena under universal laws. Given his proximity to Kant as well as J. S. 
Mill and empiricism, Dilthey is misconstrued when he is assimilated to 
“irrationalism.” The “positivism” that Dilthey rejected was Comte’s, and 
he criticized it for mistaking a perspectival worldview for metaphysical 
truth. Likewise, Dilthey did not eliminate materiality and causality in cri-
tiquing materialism as a speculative metaphysical position that leaped 
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beyond the empirical and immanent phenomena themselves into the 
immeasurable and unfathomable.22 His encouragement of empirical 
inquiry and critique of traditional metaphysics, as the expression and 
 articulation—more akin to art and poetry than science—of a feeling of 
life in a worldview instead of being a universally valid truth, was a source 
for early logical positivism. According to Gottfried Gabriel, Rudolf Car-
nap in particular adopted concepts and strategies from Dilthey, employ-
ing them in his critique of Heidegger.23
In addition to a modern “positivistic” and critical “epistemological” 
conception of nature (Natur), Dilthey articulated a less reductive notion 
of life (Leben) allowing him to rehabilitate tendencies from early modern 
and romantic Naturphilosophie, especially Spinoza, Leibniz, and Goethe, 
without making the same metaphysical and speculative assumptions 
about the nature of things. Naturphilosophie expressed and articulated 
a feeling and perspective of life rather than being a metaphysical truth. 
Encountering, embracing, and celebrating nature and life is a way of liv-
ing and communicating a life. “Nature” is not a constant here but lived, 
enacted, and interpreted in a multiplicity of lives. Life is not indepen-
dent of its expression (Ausdruck), understanding (Verstehen), and inter-
pretation (Interpretation or Auslegung), and should not be confused with 
universal scientifi c much less highly questionable metaphysical truths.
“Life” is not only biological life but  social- historical life, and is most 
adequately addressed as “a life” as expressed and interpreted in living 
it, and accordingly in self- refl ection (Selbstbesinnung) as well as autobio-
graphical, biographical, and historical narratives. Although this is not a 
Kantian approach conventionally conceived, it can be elucidated by Kant’s 
approach to the feeling of life, refl ective judgment, and sensus communis 
in the Critique of Judgment insofar as Kant’s descriptions of the beautiful as 
free of calculative interest, the sublime as apparently  counter- purposive, 
and the refl ective purposiveness associated with nature are ways of 
 non-mechanistically—yet not metaphysically or teleologically in the 
strong sense—experiencing and articulating the nexus of life as involv-
ing both the “external” natural world and the “internal” relations of the 
faculties of the subject. This analysis also places Kant’s philosophy in a dif-
ferent light, as it has a “hermeneutical” dimension insofar as the human 
subject intrinsically lacks the transparency of self- knowledge (at least as 
intelligible) but does live from the feeling of life that provokes questions 
of the self- understanding, interpretation, and individuation of that life. 
The  proto- or  quasi- hermeneutical dimensions of the third Critique indi-
cate strategies for a hermeneutics of “a” or “individuated” life that does 
not rely on metaphysical self- knowledge or rational psychology.24
Kant’s thought then does not leave us with the “bare nature” of 
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the natural sciences, as it addresses questions of individuation and per-
sonal identity through refl ective judgment and the sensus communis, 
which do not command or legislate to the phenomena but unrespon-
sively or responsively interpret and communicate them, in the context 
of the heightening and lessening of the “feeling of life” that seeks a sort 
of balance and harmony in relation to itself and its world.25 As Makkreel 
notes, such harmony is not a determinate synthesis or totalization: “A 
harmony involves a reciprocal relation between two distinct elements; a 
synthesis, as Kant conceives it, involves a one- sided infl uence for the sake 
of a strict unity.”26
Kant in a sense offers an alternative answer to a Leibnizian ques-
tion in a Newtonian context: what is a living human being or person in 
the natural world given the physical world disclosed by the new sciences? 
Leibniz had linked morality with an account of living nature by interpret-
ing monadic life as a principle of individuation, as a singular and unique 
“living mirror” refl ecting the entirety of things, and as consequently hav-
ing its own moral dignity and worth in a rational order of nature. Kant 
employed an immanent feeling of life to connect the moral, intelligible, 
and transcendent with the pragmatic and the natural in the individual. 
Kant thus radically transformed Leibniz’s threefold account of nature in 
his metaphysics as  theological- moral, teleological, and physical. Kant’s 
concern with Leibnizian questions during the period of the Critique of 
Judgment is further suggested by his publication in the same year of a 
response to Eberhard’s Leibnizian criticism of the critical philosophy.
Language, Interpretation, and 
the Individual
No mistake of method is more disastrous than the renunciation of the 
scope of historical and biographical facts in the formation of a general 
science of human nature. The achievements of human nature exist for 
us and can be studied only in the midst of society. The same relation-
ship obtains between universal science and the analysis of historical 
phenomena for all other major expressions of social life.27
Not unlike Kant then, Dilthey faced the Leibnizian issue of how 
to articulate the living dynamic individual in relation to the apparently 
impersonal contexts and systems of that life. Dilthey’s work was com-
monly, yet incorrectly attributed with espousing a dichotomy between 
nature and spirit, naturalism and spiritualism, or their reifi ed duality in 
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explanation.28 In fact, Dilthey insisted on the plural multiplicity, inherent 
confl icts, and overlapping tensions and intersections between  natural-
 biological and  social- historical life in a singular individual life in its larger 
life- nexus or context (Lebenszusammenhang). Unlike later hermeneutics, 
Gadamer recognized this tendency in Dilthey as positivism and scientism; 
Dilthey did not exclude materiality or diminish experimental empirical 
inquiry in the natural and human sciences in the name of linguistical-
ity or intersubjective spirit.29 In this emphasis, Dilthey remains closer to 
Kant than to Hegel, the Kant of the third Critique, which also concerns 
empirical inquiry proceeding from particulars and contexts rather than 
a mathematical mechanical ordering of the phenomena.
Dilthey’s controversial emphasis on descriptive and analytical, or 
interpretive, psychology is a response to the  Leibnizian- Kantian legacy 
under altered conditions. The project of an interpretive psychology was 
criticized by both reductionists, committed to thoroughly naturalizing 
the mind, and anti- reductionists who sought to preserve “truth” by brack-
eting the natural causal and social interpretive worlds. This project threat-
ened the balance of power arranged between mechanical nature, includ-
ing the physiological body and brain, and rational discourse concerning 
ideal values, logical validity and essence, and timeless rational truths.
“Psychologism,” a charge that often confl ates the real error of re-
ducing logical validity with the fear of reducing metaphysical truths to 
empirical mental states and their associations, was to be avoided even by 
positing a dichotomy between facticity and validity, as in neo- Kantianism, 
or an otherworldly realm of ideas and essences, supposedly indepen-
dent of causal conditions and interpretive contexts, as in Frege and Hus-
serl, in particular in Husserl’s polemical and problematic Logos article 
“Philosophy as a Rigorous Science.” Despite his proximity to empiricism, 
Dilthey did not advocate Mill’s psychologistic position that the laws of 
logic and mathematics are inductive truths based in psychological asso-
ciations and habits, although he rejected Platonism by insisting on their 
human and hermeneutical contexts. Induction is an important element 
of empirical inquiry for Dilthey, which he reconceived as interpretive 
through refl ective judgment.30
Dilthey’s scientifi c, naturalistic, neo- Kantian and phenomenologi-
cal critics, each side identifying him with the opposition, either reduced 
life to matter or banished facticity, materiality, and sensuous bodily exis-
tence from the life of the mind. Comparable to Leibniz and the Kant 
of the third Critique,31 Dilthey was concerned with the tensions, inter-
sections, and continuities between these dimensions of human life that 
could neither be absolutely separated from each other. In this regard, 
Dilthey brings to fruition the consequences of Kant’s sensus communis—
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as a form and confi guration of life—for our understanding of meaning 
and linguistic practice.32
In the fi rst major portrayal of his project of a “critique of historical 
reason”—that is, of a worldly and embodied reason in the Introduction to 
the Human Sciences—Dilthey formulates the complexity of the relations 
between ideal meaning or logical validity and the facticity inherent in psy-
chology, language, and history. He counterpoises this relational nexus to 
the elimination of the lived and experienced for the sake of the ideal and 
the reduction of thinking and the thought to psychological associations. 
Instead of reducing meaning, validity, and value to psychological states 
that are then reduced to material states, Dilthey established the role for 
interpretive psychology in self- refl ection and human scientifi c  inquiry.
Whereas psychology is the mediating link between the human and 
natural sciences for Dilthey, with both explanatory and interpretive tasks 
in relation to individual life, neo- Kantians such as Rickert reduce psy-
chology to a natural science in order to divide the norms and values of 
the cultural sciences from the facticity of nature. Rickert thus differenti-
ated the intelligible realm of value and validity, which oriented practical 
philosophy and the cultural sciences, from the brute facticity and sensu-
ous materiality of nature and the natural sciences.33
When we consider the facticity of meaning, its relation to its his-
torical, linguistic, and psychological conditions and context, both lin-
guistic and psychological refl ection and interpretation prove necessary. 
Consciousness is not transparent to itself and so we do not declaratively 
know ourselves through contemplation and introspection. Even the re-
lation of motive and action withdraws from clarity since the conscious 
motive is not always the real one.34 Psychology cannot be separated from 
language and history, and therefore must be both interpretive and em-
pirical. We do not have direct and transparent self- knowledge through 
introspection, and only cognize our own and other selves through the 
“externality” of expressions and objectifi cations, that is, through inter-
preting how we act, behave, and produce.
Dilthey began developing the basis for a descriptive and analytic 
psychology in the Introduction to the Human Sciences. Against the dominant 
neo- Kantianism and positivism of his time, psychology can be considered 
a human science rather than exclusively as a natural science applied to 
humans. Contrary to traditional epistemology and metaphysics, this is 
not a science of consciousness in and for itself. The psychology of the 
empirical self becomes a pressing issue once it is recognized that (1) con-
sciousness cannot escape its own contexts and conditions, including lan-
guage and history; (2) philosophical thought cannot be separated from 
empirical research; and (3) psychology plays a constitutive role in self- 
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refl ection and human scientifi c inquiry.35 The human science of psychol-
ogy unfolds in Dilthey’s works as descriptive and analytic, as well as ex-
periential and empirical. The psychology developed by Dilthey from his 
early to later thought is an interpretive psychology, because of its empha-
sis on  lived- experience (Erlebnis) in relation to sense (Sinn) and meaning 
(Bedeutung), and expression, understanding, and interpretation.
Interpretive psychology takes on an orienting role insofar as con-
sideration of the activities of the individual from out of the “internal” 
or  fi rst- person perspective of the individual characterizes one crucial 
form of inquiry in the human sciences. Dilthey developed interpretive 
psychology as a  social- historically informed psychology and an authentic 
psychology of the individual.36 It addresses both the  fi rst- person plural 
(in the pronouns “we” and “you”) and  fi rst- person singular (in the pro-
nouns “I” and “you”). Interpretive psychology expands the  fi rst- person 
perspective to analyze the  ethical- normative character of that perspec-
tive. The internal human world is constituted through  social- historically 
formed practical goods, interests, norms, purposes, and values.37 These 
are related to individual capacities such as will, thought, and feeling, as 
well as the decision, judgment, and imagination that are involved in the 
formation of meaning for someone in particular. These activities, events, 
and  structures—centering on the feeling, thought, and will of the indi-
vidual and the relation of the body to its world in the bodily “feeling of 
life”—are at the core of Dilthey’s concern with the physiological and 
psychological life of the individual.38
Dilthey articulated questions concerning human signifi cation, that 
is, the situation in which meaning occurs as language and history, and 
how this signifi cance is enacted by a bodily being in an environmental 
milieu as well as  social- historical epoch. Such questions are not resolved 
or made more intelligible by a reduction of the  social- historical to mental 
and bodily states.39 Psychology researches life from both its bodily and 
psychic sides, which he argued are bound together.40 The self, who is ad-
dressed and responds through personal pronouns, is referred not only 
to the context of its language but to the historical character of its self- 
interpretations and narratives. The situation of this self- understanding 
calls for interpretive psychology insofar as the perspective of the desires 
and thoughts of the individual agent need to be encountered in order 
to ask particular kinds of questions. These questions are not only forgot-
ten in the reduction of the world to the representation of explanatory 
relations and ideal validity claims, but reduction does not always meet its 
own goal of making the phenomenon more intelligible.41
Interpretive psychology moves from the description of the  fi rst-
 person perspective of “inner” and “lived” experience, which is always 
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symbolically mediated and thus never “pure,” to the analysis of the im-
manent contexts and conditions of this internal perspective through the 
facticity and singularity of the individual. The individual, and its experi-
ences, occur and can only be interpreted in relation to its  social- historical 
situation, that is, its formative epoch and generation, its environment 
and milieu. Although we can explain elementary psychic and bodily 
processes causally and naturalistically, all higher psychic processes and 
occurrences are historical products.42 This means that psychology as a 
science of the individual must be interpretive in order to articulate the 
individual as individual in his or her  social- historical context.
Dilthey contends that the individual can and should be approached 
through the discipline of descriptive and analytic psychology. Interpre-
tive psychology considers the individual, the processes and structures 
that operate at the level of the individual, as individual rather than ex-
plaining away individual features in terms of some construct that does 
violence to particularity (constructs such as the economy, power, or tradi-
tion). Considerations of essence, ideal meaning, and validity can also be 
reductive insofar as—for instance, in neo- Kantianism—they do not con-
cern meaning in relation to meaning for anyone in particular. However, 
the human sciences can and should take the individual (as a particular) 
as an object of research. They cannot operate then exclusively through 
the idealizations of logical and explanatory reduction but they require 
and presuppose taking a phenomenon as it discloses itself (such as the 
individuality of an individual, the sociality of the social).
Individuality is not accidental or extrinsic to human life nor even to 
social life. The individual is the intersection or crossing of  social- historical 
forces, processes, and structures without which they would not occur.43 
Dilthey’s thought proceeds from the individual in its  social- historical and 
worldly context to the individual as singular, individuation, and the indi-
vidual as a crossing of multiple systems and processes, that is, socializa-
tion.44 If the individual is signifi cant for the human sciences, then in-
terpretive psychology should play a central role in their formation and 
refl ection.
Concern for the singular is not only found in Dilthey’s interest in 
psychology, but in biography and autobiography as narratives that enact 
the individual and perspectival character of history, language, and psy-
chology as well as show the plurality and unfathomability within all im-
manence. Biography does not concern the universal but the unique in 
its historicity.45 The life disclosed in biography is interpreted by Dilthey, 
in his early Life of Schleiermacher (1870), as the unfolding and interacting 
relation of the singular and the whole;46 of individual and generation.47 
The study of the historical formation of the individual in the context 
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of his or her generation is basic to Dilthey’s conception of history.48 A 
“generation” is not merely the receptivity, homogeneity, and dependency 
of its members; it consists of their sharing in possibilities unavailable to 
other generations.49
Autobiographical understanding is how the individual interprets 
herself in her generation and  social- historical world. It would be mean-
ingless for that individual, as individuated, if it were only a story about 
the community, society, and tradition. Likewise, it would be vacant with-
out relations to others from friends to strangers. Self- understandings, 
interpretations in the form of action and event descriptions, as narra-
tives that differentiate between agents, are as essential to interpretation 
as appealing to collective customs, norms, values, and traditions. If the 
identity of individual and group is not simply presupposed so as to avoid 
the diffi cult questions of their relatedness and distance, their connection 
becomes a pivotal question for the human sciences: how is the individual 
also socialized and set within a social life- world? In biography, the ques-
tion “who” is addressed to another as in autobiography it is addressed 
to oneself. The question of “who” is not that of a thingly “what” and 
thus demands a different way of responding than the “why” of causal 
 explanation.
Ricoeur distinguished the signifi cance of who and what in Dilthey 
while misconstruing its import. Dilthey’s interest in biography—as cen-
tral to history—and interpretive psychology—as central to the human 
sciences—is oriented by the question of the singular50 and understand-
ing singularity responsively from out of itself instead of reducing the 
 fi rst- person perspective of the who, and hence the potential upsurge 
of singularity, to a  third- person psychological explanation (contrary to 
Ricoeur).51 The immanent structures of the “who” are analyzed by Dilthey 
through the “categories of life.” These lived and performatively enacted 
categories, a forerunner of Heidegger’s existentials, are irreducible to 
the instrumental and abstract categories that humans apply to things.52
Dilthey’s distinction of “inner” and “outer,” “internal” and exter-
nal,” refers to the difference of  fi rst- person and  third- person perspectives. 
Thus, meaning and validity do not occur in relation to the “interior-
ity” of private psychic states; they are fi rst and foremost symbolic forma-
tions of meaning and validity that are fundamentally  social- historical. As 
Matthias Jung claimed, the “internal” or  fi rst- person viewpoint—both in 
its plural (we, you) and singular (I, you) forms—is radically distinctive 
for Dilthey from the objectivating or “external”  third- person perspec-
tive (which perceives and constructs beings as abstract isolated objects).53 
The  fi rst- person perspective is symbolically reproduced through the webs 
or nexus of signifi cation of the life- world. Interpretive psychology, biog-
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raphy, and autobiography function for Dilthey as orienting exemplary 
disciplines for the human sciences, because of how they bring individual 
experience and self- understanding into the foreground of human scien-
tifi c inquiry.54
The Interdependence of Epistemology, 
Psychology, and Hermeneutics
In this section, I explore the role of psychology and its centrality in Dil-
they’s “middle period” from 1883 to 1896.55 Dilthey’s writings from the 
early 1890s articulate an interpretive psychology in the context of the 
intersection of epistemology and life. This defi es Heidegger and Gadam-
er’s assimilation of Dilthey to traditional epistemology, which he radically 
transforms, and neo- Kantianism from which he radically diverges.56 Dil-
they argued for a phenomenality or immanence prior to the intellectu-
alism of phenomenalism and for the independence of reality from the 
subject through the resistance and tension, which intensifi es the feel-
ing of life even as it reveals the co- givenness of self and world. Under 
the traditional form of an argument for the “external” existence of the 
world, Dilthey radicalizes this canonical epistemological problem by anti- 
canonically demonstrating the  bodily- worldly character of human life. 
This work suggests a hermeneutics of bodily being in the world that of-
fers a basis for interpretive psychology.57
Dilthey developed the interpretive human science of psychology 
primarily in his Ideas Concerning a Descriptive and Analytic Psychology (Ideen 
über eine beschreibende und zergliedernde Psychologie, 1894) and in 
his Contributions to the Study of Individuality (Beiträge zum Studium der Indi-
vidualität, 1895/ 1896). One principal task of this psychology is to correct 
the abstraction and reifi ed dualities of previous epistemology. Dilthey 
thereby contested the assumptions of neo- Kantian epistemology, which 
claimed the “absolute independence of epistemology from psychology. 
It alleges that Kant’s critique of reason has in principle emancipated the 
theory of knowledge from psychology by giving it a particular [i.e., tran-
scendental] method.”58 Contrary to the claim that knowledge concerns 
ideal validity independent of facticity, Dilthey argued that knowledge 
involves a knower and thus always presupposes what he called the “ac-
quired psychic nexus.”59
The epistemologist abstracts from the living psychic nexus such 
that he believes in the transparency, independence, and certainty of a 
self- consciousness unencumbered by the facticity of the world. Episte-
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mology, however, cannot be liberated from the empirical conditions of 
knowledge. The epistemologist presupposes the acquired psychic nexus 
while denying its role: “He presupposes it. He makes use of it, but he is 
not in control of it. Interpretations of this nexus in psychological con-
cepts suggested by the language and thought of his times necessarily 
insinuate themselves into his epistemology.”60 Rather than freeing knowl-
edge from psychology, neo- Kantianism presupposes an inadequate and 
inappropriate conception of the psychological which undermines the 
purity of its own epistemic project and blocks it from opening and articu-
lating the relations between knowledge and experience, knowing and its 
bodily, psychic, and  social- historical conditions.
The abstract dualities of neo- Kantian thought, such as the separa-
tion of intuition and intellect, matter and form, and facticity and validity, 
“destroy the coherence of a living nexus.”61 Dilthey contended that epis-
temology cannot be reduced to even an interpretive psychology and yet 
it cannot do without it either: “It would certainly be impossible to have a 
thoroughly elaborated descriptive psychology as the foundation of epis-
temology. But, on the other hand, a presuppositionless theory of knowl-
edge is an illusion.”62 Knowledge and the theory of knowledge occur in 
the tension of validity claims and facticity of those who make such claims 
and their world. Rather than the “logicism” of reducing psychology and 
the human sciences to a foundational epistemology, or metaphysics of 
ideal validity, or the psychologism that reduces epistemic and logical va-
lidity to psychological facts, Dilthey argues for the interdependence of 
the theory of knowledge and the knowledge achieved in the individual 
sciences. Epistemology is a “founding” of the sciences only in the sense 
of self- refl ection and articulation, as it is fundamentally founded in the 
practices of the sciences. Dilthey established the founding/ founded 
character of epistemology in the interdependence of a multiplicity of 
forms of inquiry.63
Dilthey describes how the interpretive psychology informing epis-
temology is “psychology in movement; to be sure, in movement towards 
a determined end. It rests on the self- refl ection that includes psychic 
life examined in its entire scope—questions of universal validity, truth 
and reality are only determined according to their sense.”64 Questions 
of meaning and validity are situated refl ectively in the context of their 
 worldly- bodily sense and  social- historical signifi cation. Dilthey makes 
clear that epistemology cannot be deduced from self- knowing conscious-
ness or from logic and psychology, and consequently descriptive psychol-
ogy cannot be posited as a fi nal ground or foundation.65
It is incorrect to accuse Dilthey of psychologism, since Dilthey advo-
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cated the importance of refl ecting on the facticity of consciousness and 
knowledge without reducing validity claims to mental processes or con-
tents. This would run essentially counter to Dilthey’s development of an 
interpretive human science of psychology rather than a causal explana-
tory psychology, which would reduce thought and the truth of its claims 
to physiological- psychological effects.66 Nor does Dilthey further “natu-
ralize” truth in reducing mental to material causal relations, even as he 
refuses to bracket causality in order to isolate a realm of ideal meaning 
and value. The confusion is due to Husserl’s analogical assimilation of 
Dilthey’s position, including his psychology, to naturalism in the essay 
“Philosophy as Rigorous Science.” Levinas accordingly commented in an 
early work that Husserl’s problem with “psychologism” was its reliance on 
the ontology of naturalism.67
There is a radical questioning of and break with the reduction to 
naturalism in Dilthey, including the explanatory reduction to psychology 
and psychology to material relations. Explanatory psychology refl ects the 
unifying tendency that is inappropriate for the human sciences in being 
unreceptive to how its objects are given. It instead “sets up a causal sys-
tem claiming to make all the manifestations of mental life intelligible”68 
and presupposes that “it is able to derive from a limited number of well- 
determined elements an absolutely complete and transparent knowledge 
of the appearance of the mental.”69 It dismantles the life- nexus and puts 
in its place a constructed systematic totality.70 Such strategies have their 
role and usefulness, even within the human sciences, but are inappropri-
ate for an interpretive psychology concerned with individuality.
In the face of the opposition of positivist psychologists such as 
Ebbinghaus and neo- Kantians such as Rickert, Dilthey critiqued the as-
sumptions of transparency and totality in explanatory psychology and 
resituated the legitimate use of causal explanation in relation to the in-
terpretive inquiry of the human science of psychology. The interpretive 
or hermeneutical phenomena are formed in relation to evaluations, in-
tentions, norms, prescriptions, purposes, rules, and values. Yet this di-
mension is seen in the context of the enactment and facticity of these 
phenomena rather than from a perspective that detaches them from 
their worldly  social- historical embodiment, such as occurs in the subor-
dination of the objects of the “cultural sciences” to questions of norms 
and values—understood as “goods” independent of sensuous desire, fac-
ticity, and particularity71—in neo- Kantianism.72 It is a misconception of 
metaphysics and the representationalism of disenchanted and secular-
ized epistemology to believe that the transcendent and transcendental 
can be known outside of the immanence and phenomenality of the ex-
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periential and empirical. The moment of transcendence and the tran-
scendental conditions of life occur within life’s immanence and can only 
be articulated receptively from out of its immanence.
Dilthey’s interpretive psychology is descriptive, formative, and ana-
lytic rather than causal, constructive, and hypothetical. This hermeneu-
tical psychology is relevant for cognitive knowledge, as humans encoun-
ter and understand each other and their world out of the co- givenness 
and proximity of self and world and the historicity of their life. Humans 
are worldly historical beings, insofar as they act within a situation, that 
is, an environment and epoch. Similarly, descriptive and analytic psy-
chology refers to this fundamental historicity of human life.73 Without 
the ontic, empirical, and temporal contexts and conditions of that life, 
epistemology is impossible and irrelevant. The language of grounding 
and founding is retained by Dilthey while being drastically reconceived 
as the hermeneutics of “a life” interpreted in relation to its overlapping 
contexts of history, language, and psychology.
Language, Psychology, and 
Sensus Communis
Dilthey’s hermeneutics has its sources in language rather than being 
reduced to the individual’s psychology.74 To mention an example from 
Of German Poetry and Music (Von Deutscher Dichtung und Musik), Dilthey 
showed the constitutive signifi cance of language, myth, and poetry 
(Sprache, Mythos, Dichtung) for the formation of communal life.75 Early 
human history is characterized exactly by the power of the whole over 
the individual such that individuals are formed by and bound to a com-
mon life (Gemeinleben) and sensus communis (Gemeingesit) characterized 
by language, myth, and poetry. This sensus communis is the condition of 
the greatest creations of a people and the greatest creation and creative 
epoch of a people is precisely in the formation and cultivation of their 
language and myth.76
The sensus communis is not only relevant to “early” traditional hu-
manity. It plays a role in modernity, even as differentiation and individu-
ation fundamentally characterize the achievement of modern societies. 
For example, Dilthey asked: “Who is the subject of Bach’s music?” and 
responded that it was not the isolated individual, but the community 
as conditioned in relation to the form of that particular society, that is, 
what can be more typically described as the sensus communis of Protestant 
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Christianity in  eighteenth- century Germany.77 The individuality and in-
teriority privileged by this community were themselves an expression of 
this religious community rather than being merely subjective or the crea-
tion of isolated subjects.78 Individuality has its  social- historical conditions 
such that the importance of the individual could not simply be separated 
from  social- historical reality.
Ordinary understanding and its complications are the point of de-
parture for interpretation, which for Schleiermacher is two- sided: lin-
guistic interpretation analyzes the generalizing structures of language, 
and psychological interpretation concerns their individuation. Already 
in his early account of linguistic and psychological interpretation in 
Schleiermacher, Dilthey focused on the links between ideal meaning 
(validity), the facticity of language and history, and individuality and the 
psychological correlates of meaning. Dilthey’s project of an interpretive 
psychology, that is, the descriptive and analytic psychology developed in 
his middle works, emerged in this context. Whereas psychological inter-
pretation concerns the individuation of a life in relation to its various 
contexts, Dilthey transforms Schleiermacher’s linguistic interpretation 
into interpretation of all actions and expressions of historical life. The 
arts of linguistic and psychological interpretation are both hermeneuti-
cal. Their common context is the interpretation of the interconnections 
and tensions across differences, which does not constitute the unity of a 
synthesis but at most a refl ective harmony. This contests the reifi ed divi-
sion of a non- interpretive psychological science of “mind” in contrast 
with a hermeneutics of action and expression, as Apel argues.79
Overlooking the refl ective, interpretive, and  pluralistic- holistic 
character of Dilthey’s project, which is evident in relation to the third 
Critique, has led to a common yet inaccurate claim that Dilthey is a dualist 
about nature and spirit, vital life and historical reason, explanation and 
understanding, or “indirect” and “external” objective experience (Erfah-
rung) and “direct” and “internal” subjective lived experience (Erlebnis).80 
The latter claim is inappropriate to the extent that experience is interpre-
tive, even of the “self,” and consequently “indirect” or mediated without 
either direct immediate self- transparency or the mediated fi nality of syn-
thesis and totality. The phenomenology of the movement of experience, 
whether construed as cognitive knowledge or lived experience, occurs 
in fi nitude, and is possible only because of the sensus communis and the 
intersubjective communicative dimensions of a historical form of life.
If we consider the facticity of meaning, its relations to a historical 
context and individual situation, Dilthey does not suppress linguistic 
meaning and conceptual validity but articulated both in relation to the 
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 social- historical life in which they occur. Dilthey unfolded questions con-
cerning the situation in which meaning as language occurs and how 
meaning is enacted in the comportment of a  bodily- perceptual being in 
a milieu.81 Psychology is part of the human sciences insofar as the feeling 
of and for life cannot be excluded from them, and as feelings, desires, 
volitions, and thoughts of individual life need to be interpreted in order 
to pursue particular kinds of questions about worldly,  social- historical, 
and linguistic agents. The lived experiential and empirical world is for-
gotten if its medium of interpretation in communication is lost in either 
the reduction to naturalistic or materialist causation in explanation or to 
ideal truths, values, and validity claims in philosophical demonstration.
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